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OPPORTUNITY, WILLINGNESS, 
AND THE DIFFUSION OF WAR 
RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON 
University of California 
Davis 
HARVEY STARR 
University of South Carolina 
sing borders and alliances as indicators of opportunity and willing- 
ness, respectively, we test the relationship between these and the diffusion of war during 
the 1816-1965 period. The impact of borders and alliances, individually and in combina- 
tion, on the growth of ongoing war through "infectious" diffusion is shown through the 
comparison of baseline cases to cases where states at peace were exposed to various 
"treatments" comprised of warring border nations or warring alliance partners. The 
findings indicate that the probability of war diffusion is substantially increased as oppor- 
tunities and willingness increase, particularly when such geographic and political factors 
are combined. The applicability of the opportunity and willingness framework to the 
study of war and diffusion is expanded and confirmed. 
A considerable 
amount of the early empirical research on 
war attempted to explain its onset by 
looking at the effects of one or several in- 
dependent variables on a dependent indi- 
cator variable, such as, for example, the 
nation-months of war (Singer, Bremer, 
and Stucky 1972; Singer and Small 1968) 
or the number of nations at war (Singer 
and Small 1974). The initially unrecog- 
nized problem with this procedure is the 
conflation of the onset of war (a dichot- 
omous variable) with the size of a war (a 
continuous variable). The problem, how- 
ever, has consequences significantly 
beyond what type of measurement is ap- 
propriate, since by using the size of a war 
while the theory under investigation 
specifies that onset is being measured, the 
distinct possibility of diffusion is over- 
looked. This means that the process by 
which the first two nations in a war begin 
fighting may be considerably different 
than the process by which subsequent 
participants join the war. This blurred 
distinction neglects what is usually 
referred to as Galton's problem (Ross and 
Homer 1976). Under circumstances where 
diffusion is present but unrecognized, the 
resulting models are necessarily 
misspecified and most probably investi- 
gated with inappropriate methods. 
Because of the recognition of this prob- 
lem, more recent research as moved in 
two new directions. One of these focuses 
on the behavior of the initial participants 
in wars and attempts to explain only their 
behavior. To a considerable extent this is 
accomplished by considering the onset of 
war as the end product of a dispute be- 
tween nations (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1986; 
Leng and Gochman 1982; Maoz 1982). 
A second line of research is based on 
the recognition that wars might diffuse, or 
be "contagious."' In general, research on 
the diffusion of war began with determin- 
ing the extent to which wars were "infec- 
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tious" (Davis, Duncan, and Siverson 
1978; Faber, Houweling, and Siccama 
1984; Most and Starr 1981) and, after 
establishing that they were, seeking to un- 
cover the factors responsible for variation 
in the diffusion processes. In general, two 
lines of investigation have been followed 
on the diffusion of war. The first of these 
is based upon borders as interaction op- 
portunities (Most and Starr 1980; 
O'Loughlin 1984; Ward and Kirby 1987). 
The second centers on alliances as indica- 
tors of groups of states that share roughly 
the same international policies and may 
be willing to fight together for them 
(Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; 
Siverson and King 1980). 
These two lines of research on the diffu- 
sion of war-borders and alliances-have 
only recently been connected in prelimin- 
ary empirical analysis (Most et al. 1987; 
Siverson and Starr 1988). In the present 
research the data set has been expanded 
significantly over previous collections, 
new analytic tools have been added and 
greater attention is given to interaction of 
method, theory, and empirical findings. 
In particular, the research we present 
brings borders and alliances together 
within a theoretical framework based on 
the ideas of opportunity and willingness. 
The use of this framework permits us to 
examine ongoing wars as events that alter 
the incentive-constraint structures per- 
ceived by foreign policy decision makers, 
thus increasing the chances that nations 
will become involved in an ongoing war. 
The analyses presented here will be con- 
ceived in terms of a research design in 
which particular conditions or sets of con- 
ditions are "treatments," which may or 
may not produce effects.2 
Opportunity and Willingness 
in the Diffusion of War 
Following the work of Most and Starr, 
the diffusion analyses presented here will 
be developed within the general frame- 
work provided by the concepts of oppor- 
tunity and willingness (Most and Starr 
1989, chap. 2; Starr 1978a). As ordering 
concepts, they form the basis for linking 
environmental and systemic factors to the 
behavior of decision makers and govern- 
ments that represent states. 
By opportunity we mean the possibil- 
ities that are available to any entity within 
any environment, representing the total 
set of environmental constraints and 
possibilities. While opportunity thus 
represents macro level (environmental 
and structural) factors, willingness repre- 
sents the choice processes that occur on 
the micro level, that is, the selection of 
some behavioral option from a range of 
alternatives. This framework is derived 
from Sprout and Sprout's (1969) "eco- 
logical triad" of the relationship among 
entity, environment, and entity-environ- 
ment. In it their concepts of environmen- 
tal possibilism, environmental probabil- 
ism, and cognitive behaviorism require 
the combination of both structure- 
environment and choice-decision process, 
captured in opportunity and willingness, 
respectively. Thus, opportunity and will- 
ingness are concerned with the relation- 
ships that nest decision makers within 
their surrounding environments. 
The central use of opportunity is as the 
degree of interaction. This conception of 
opportunity has been the primary impetus 
in Most and Starr's work on the effects of 
borders as interaction opportunities in the 
diffusion of violent conflict. As in Sprout 
and Sprout's environmental possibilism, 
this simply means that some activity must 
at base be physically, technologically or 
intellectually possible. Once the obstacle 
of possibility is crossed, however, oppor- 
tunity is, in fact, a continuous phenome- 
non in which some nations have more or 
less of it with respect to other nations. 
The dual nature of opportunity-possi- 
bility (especially as it relates to capabili- 
ties) must be recognized. Initially, some 
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capability (technology, ideology or re- 
ligion, form of government, manner of 
organizing people to some task, etc.) must 
be created so as to be part of the range of 
possibilities available to at least some 
members of the international system. 
However, there is then an important sec- 
ond dimension in the effects of opportu- 
nity-possibility-the distribution of such 
capabilities in the international system. 
At one level all international actors share 
the same menu of possibilities-for exam- 
ple, no nation could have had nuclear 
weapons to fight World War I; the United 
Nations could not have been used to sepa- 
rate the United States and Mexican forces 
in 1846; and any nation may avail itself of 
the International Court of Justice. At 
another level international actors may 
have very different menus of possibil- 
ities-for example, the wealth, technolog- 
ical talent, and resources needed to take 
advantage of the nuclear possibility are 
not evenly distributed across nations 
today. 
The concept of willingness is more 
familiar, being central to the study of 
decision making and choice. The dynam- 
ics of choice are embedded in a decision 
maker's image of the world, or definition 
of the situation. Willingness is related to a 
decision maker's calculations of advan- 
tage and disadvantage, cost and benefit, 
considered on both conscious and uncon- 
scious levels. It is through willingness that 
decision makers recognize opportunities 
and then translate those opportunities 
into alternatives that are weighed in some 
manner. 
As is implied above, opportunity and 
willingness are linked in a number of 
ways. They do not create mutually exclu- 
sive categories. Anything that affects the 
structural possibilities of the environment 
or environments within which decision 
makers must act also affects the incentive 
structures for those decision makers. Op- 
portunity and willingness thus become 
more than organizing concepts. They take 
on theoretical characteristics when we 
understand that they describe the condi- 
tions that are necessary for the occurrence 
of events. They are necessary but not suf- 
ficient for the occurrence of international 
outcomes uch as war. 
Opportunity, conceived of as interac- 
tion opportunity, has been central to the 
geopolitical study of positive spatial diffu- 
sion. This has been most explicitly and ex- 
tensively developed by Most and Starr, 
who use borders as the interaction oppor- 
tunity through which violent conflict 
would spread. Borders are investigated 
and conceptualized as "constraints on the 
interaction opportunities of nations" 
(Starr and Most 1976). Simple geographic 
proximity, as indicated by borders of 
various kinds, is related to both the 
amount of interaction and the probability 
of various types of interaction, such as 
war (see Starr and Most 1978). To some 
extent, borders represent a proximity be- 
tween states that increases both the sali- 
ence of the neighboring territories and (in 
general) the ease of interaction. Thus, 
because states are probably more likely to 
be more attuned to, and involved in, 
political situations on their borders, there 
is a tendency for opportunity to shape the 
range of willingness-although power 
certainly affords some nations the possi- 
bility of very wide openings for defining 
their borders. Briefly, the various works 
of Most and Starr argue that opportunity 
for interaction is a necessary condition for 
the positive spatial diffusion of violent 
conflict, that borders are one factor pro- 
viding such an opportunity, and that the 
empirical evidence for the 1946-65 period 
indicates that positive spatial diffusion of 
violent conflict occurred along the ease- 
ments provided by borders. 
It needs to be emphasized that within 
such a warring border nation framework 
it is not reasoned that borders cause wars 
but rather that they contribute to the 
potential outbreak of violence because the 
more borders a nation has, the greater (1) 
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the number of risks and opportunities 
confronting the nation, (2) the likelihood 
that the nation or its territories will be 
"conditionally viable" (Boulding 1962), 
and (3) the level of that nation's uncer- 
tainty. Under these conditions, it is 
asserted, nations have a greater probabil- 
ity of going to war (see also Diehl and 
Goertz 1988). 
Additionally, Most and Starr argue 
that once a war starts on a nation's 
border, that nation may find its environ- 
ment changed in such a way that it either 
participates in a war it did not intend to 
join or forgoes fighting a war that it had 
intended to join. The warring border na- 
tion model thus analyzes whether states 
that experience the treatment of having a 
warring nation on their borders have their 
environment and decision calculus altered 
so as to alter the probability of their own 
subsequent war involvement, or not. (See 
Starr and Most 1985 for a full elaboration 
of the warring border nation model.) 
While borders can in general be concep- 
tualized as an "agent" of diffusion rep- 
resenting the effects of opportunity, 
another such agent, alliances, represents 
willingness.3 Numerous observers of 
alliances in international relations have 
commented on their entangling nature. 
Following this general line of argument, a 
second approach to the problem of war 
diffusion has thus focused on the extent to 
which alliance commitments could be 
responsible for the diffusion of wars. 
Siverson and King (1979, 1980) explore 
the extent to which the independent effect 
of alliance memberships and the attributes 
of different types of alliances account for 
the extent and character of war diffusion. 
Recognizing the work of Most and Starr 
on diffusion and borders, Siverson and 
King argue that alliances, unlike geogra- 
phy, result from a deliberate process of 
policy choice. States clearly have much 
greater latitude in their choice of allies 
than the states on their borders.4 It is thus 
important to recognize alliances as 
manipulable interaction opportunities. 
More importantly, it is reasonable to 
look at alliances as a conscious choice 
among foreign policy behaviors or policy 
positions. The willingness to form alli- 
ances-and with specific partners-may 
be seen as an indicator of shared policy 
preference. Put simply, two (or n) nations 
forming an alliance are indicating, to 
some degree, that they share policy pref- 
erences.5 This conception of alliances, im- 
plicit in the work of Siverson and King, is 
explicitly developed in Bueno de Mes- 
quita's (1981) model of expected utility, 
an approach centered on the calculations 
that lead to willingness.6 
The research we report here seeks to in- 
vestigate the effects of both opportunity 
and willingness on the diffusion of war. 
This will be done by looking at the indi- 
vidual and combined effects of borders 
and alliances on the diffusion of war 
among members of the international 
system over the period 1816-1965. 
Research Design and Data 
Generation 
While several studies of conflict diffu- 
sion have relied on varieties of autocor- 
relation (Hill and Rothchild 1986; 
O'Loughlin 1984), the method we chose is 
considerably simpler. It has much in com- 
mon with various epidemiological models 
in that it examines the magnitude of the 
effects of being exposed to various condi- 
tions as treatments. More specifically, it 
allows us to explore various changes in 
the probability that nations will enter an 
ongoing war if they have a warring 
border nation (WBN) or a warring alli- 
ance partner (WAP). 
In order to evaluate the impact of 
WBNs and WAPs on the diffusion of war 
we constructed a data set containing 
several types of information on national 
borders, national alliance commitments, 
and national war participation. Data were 
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collected and coded in order to test both a 
WBN hypothesis and a WAP hypothesis. 
Thus, the WBN hypothesis and the WAP 
hypothesis may be tested separately, and 
the strength of the results compared. The 
data also permit us to look at the impact 
of a nation's bordering states that are also 
allies. This will enable us to test the com- 
bined treatment of a nation's being both a 
WBN and a WAP. Again, the results of 
these analyses may be compared to the 
results of the analyses of each factor 
singly. 
In order to make the appropriate com- 
parisons, however, it is necessary to do 
more than simply record the relevant 
border and alliance information for the 
instances in which nations entered a war. 
Doing so would tell us something about 
the process of diffusion, but such a pro- 
cedure would deal only with "successful" 
cases in which diffusion took place. The 
cases in which a nation experienced some 
type of either a WBN or WAP but did not 
enter the war would be lost from view; 
hence, no estimate could be made of the 
effect of the variable on the larger popu- 
lation within which these nations exist 
(see Most and Starr 1989, esp. chaps. 
3-5). 
In order to pursue our purpose of 
assessing the joint and individual effects 
of borders and alliances on the war expe- 
riences of states, it was necessary to bring 
together data on war participation, alli- 
ances, and borders of each state in the in- 
ternational system for each year between 
1815 and 1965. Information on the set of 
states in the system, war participation, 
and national alliance commitments was 
relatively easy to acquire. The set of states 
was taken from the lists provided in Small 
and Singer (1982). We also noted the 
power status of the various nations, using 
a simple division of nations into either 
major power or minor power status.7 
There are, of course, several generally 
available data sets on international war, 
including, most notably, those of Kende 
(1971, 1978), Richardson (1960), Small 
and Singer (1982), and Wright (1965). 
Most and Starr's initial diffusion analyses 
used a combination of all these sources, as 
those analyses, in actuality, investigated 
the diffusion of any organized violent 
conflict (whether it was civil war, internal 
conflict, or intervention or relatively 
small-scale violence) as well as large-scale 
organized interstate violence. We, 
however, focus on interstate war for the 
entire state system over the post- 
Napoleonic era. 
We thus selected the larger-scale inter- 
state war data set presented in Small and 
Singer 1982, which represents an updating 
and refinement of a well-established 
earlier effort by the same authors (Singer 
and Small 1972) to present the data of the 
Correlates of War Project. There were 
several other reasons to select this war 
data set. First, it incorporates a great deal 
of the information contained in the earlier 
studies by Wright (1965) and Richardson 
(1960). The data used here cover more 
contemporary events than the compila- 
tions by Wright and Richardson but also 
cover much earlier periods than the 
post-1945 data of others (e.g., Kende). 
Finally, utilizing Small and Singer's data 
will make our findings compatible with 
the growing body of empirical work that 
has derived from the Correlates of War 
Project (Gochman and Sabrosky 1990). 
The alliance data also are a product of 
the Correlates of War Project. In this case 
we drew upon Sabrosky's (1975) extensive 
revision of an earlier work by Singer and 
Small (1968) that provided an initial list- 
ing of formal international alliances be- 
tween states during the period 1815- 
1965. In the case of each alliance, we iden- 
tified its class as coded by Singer and 
Small: defense, neutrality, or entente. 
These will be referred to as Al, A2, and 
A3, respectively. 
We view these types of alliance com- 
mitments as forming an ordinal index of 
willingness. Using Sabrosky's discussion, 
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Garnham (1988, 15) outlines these three 
types of alliances as developed by the 
Correlates of War Project: "The strongest 
alliance commitment is a defense pact, . . . 
in which the signatories agree to intervene 
militarily in the event of an attack on one 
of their number. Next, insofar as the for- 
mal strength of the alliance is concerned, 
is the neutrality or nonaggression pact, 
... which obligates the signatories to re- 
main militarily neutral should one of 
them become involved in a war.... Final- 
ly, the entente . . . merely required 
consultations or conversations if one of 
the signatories was attacked." Thus, we 
expect that WAPs involving defensive 
alliances (Al) will have a greater likeli- 
hood of producing diffusion than nonag- 
gression pacts (A2) or finally the ententes 
(A3). 
The most difficult data to gather were 
those indicating which states shared 
borders. However, through the use of 
several excellent historical atlases 
(Shepherd 1932 and Hammond Historical 
Atlas of the World), it was possible to 
ascertain the border network of states 
back to 1815. Specifically, in a modified 
version of the coding rules used by Starr 
and Most (1976), we recorded for each 
state the entities on its contiguous 
borders, those across less than two hun- 
dred miles of open water and those on the 
borders of its colonial possessions.8 We 
refer to these as Bi, B2, and B3, respec- 
tively. 
As noted, we regard the divisions of the 
border and alliance variables as having an 
ordinal value. In terms of the opportunity 
and willingness concepts discussed we 
hypothesize that the greatest opportunity 
is present with contiguous borders, then 
cross-water borders, and finally, colonial 
borders (Starr and Most 1976). At that 
point considerable variation is intro- 
duced. Similarly, the greatest willingness 
should be present with defense alliances, 
then neutrality agreements, and then 
ententes. 
Using the nation-year as the basic unit 
of analysis, the completion of the data 
collection eventuated in a data set of 
3,929 cases, representing a coding of the 
borders, alliances, and war participation 
of all nations in all years between 1816 
and 1965 in which a war either started or 
was ongoing. However, to make our test 
as rigorous as possible we removed a 
number of cases. First, in order to test for 
diffusion as the growth of war it was 
necessary to remove the initial two partic- 
ipants in a war. Second, once a nation 
entered a war it was deleted from the data 
set until the war was concluded or the na- 
tion left the war. These reductions pro- 
duced a final data set of 3,749 cases. 
Within this data set there were 94 cases of 
war diffusion whose existence we will at- 
tempt to explain on the basis of oppor- 
tunity and willingness.9 
In order to differentiate positive spatial 
diffusion from both reinforcement phe- 
nomena and negative spatial diffusion, a 
set of expectations was derived and 
tested. The procedure used here is derived 
from one used in an earlier study by Starr 
and Most (1983, pp. 110-11).1O In their 
design they began by "looking for all 
states at any given point in time which 
were at peace (to avoid complications 
with 'reinforcement' effects) and asked 
two questions: (1) at what point in time 
did they have any warring border na- 
tions? (2) Within the next five years did 
they have any new war participations?" 
There is one major deviation in the 
present study from the design set out 
above. Instead of looking at a treatment 
at time tO and subsequent behavior only 
during the t1-t5 period, we have looked 
at all years (tO) in which the international 
system was experiencing war (some 83 
years between 1816 and 1965) and exam- 
ined the extent to which nations not at 
war in t - 1, either were or were not ex- 
posed to various combinations of WBNs 
or WAPs and either did or did not go to 
war in year tO. Recall that once a nation 
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enters a war, it is removed from the data 
set until the war is ended or the nation 
leaves the war. Under this procedure it is 
possible then to aggregate the results of all 
war years for each of the treatments. 
This procedure made it possible for us 
to estimate and compare the effects of 
various combinations of WBNs and 
WAPs. Moreover, by running identical 
tables for the conditions of any border or 
any alliance we were able to estimate the 
extent to which WBNs and WAPs made a 
difference over counterpart conditions 
where war as a condition or treatment 
was absent; that is, we could compare the 
effects of having a contiguous WBN to the 
effects of simply having contiguous 
border nations or compare the effects of 
having a defense pact WAP to the effects 
of simply having defense pact partners. 
Delineating the effects of the various 
types and combinations of borders and 
alliances without WBNs or WAPs thus 
gives us a set of baselines for comparing 
the war-joining rate of those states with 
WBNs or WAPs. 
The logic of our investigation of diffu- 
sion centers on the notion of treatment, 
that is, the notion that the environment of 
the decision makers of states will have 
been changed by the existence of war in a 
bordering nation or in one of its alliance 
partners. As developed by Starr and Most 
in regard to borders (1976), and in terms 
of foreign policy decisions in general 
(Most and Starr 1989), such treatments 
may alter the opportunities facing deci- 
sion makers as well as their willingness to 
pursue certain behavioral alternatives, 
such as going to war. The argument also 
follows our notions that states' interac- 
tions will tend to follow along the paths 
provided by interaction opportunities 
such as proximity (borders) and common 
policy interests-high value salience (alli- 
ances). 
The theoretical basis of opportunity 
and willingness, as well as for interaction 
opportunity, has been developed at length 
by Most and Starr (1980, 1989). The 
WBN model derives from the notion of in- 
teraction opportunity-the physical 
possibilities for interaction, factors that 
increase the probability that such interac- 
tion will take place, and the perception of 
both possibility and probability by deci- 
sion makers. This idea is rooted in the 
ecological and geopolitical concepts and 
formulations of Sprout and Sprout 
(1969), as later modified by Starr's con- 
cepts of opportunity and willingness. It 
should be recognized that the concept of 
opportunity encompasses important com- 
ponents of the geographical theory of 
proximity and its effects (Boulding 1962; 
Gleditsch 1969; and Zipf 1949). For exam- 
ple, Boulding's loss-of-strength gradient 
links geographical components to threat 
perception and the role of uncertainty 
(Midlarsky 1975). 
Our expectations on the effects of such 
treatments also may be seen within a 
'loose necessity" framework; that is, 
these treatments are to be seen as loosely 
necessary but not sufficient for influenc- 
ing the war-joining behavior of states. We 
are not arguing that such treatments 
always lead to joining ongoing wars but 
that war behavior is much more likely to 
occur if such treatments have occurred. 
This is the "loose" aspect of the logically 
necessary relationship between treatment 
and consequence. The key to these expec- 
tations is cell d in Table 1, which sets out 
our basic treatment matrix. Cell d indi- 
cates that a state has joined a war subse- 
quent to being exposed to the relevant 
treatment. The central expectation is that 
Table 1. The Border-Alliance 
Treatment Matrix 
War Treatment 
Participation Absent Present 
Absent a b 
Present c d 
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there should be a clear and strong differ- 
ence in cell d between matrices where 
there is a treatment and matrices where 
there is no treatment; that is, analyses 
presented will contrast he results found 
in a matrix where the columns simply 
note the presence or absence of borders or 
alliances to the results of a matrix that 
looks like the one presented in Table 1, 
where warring border nations or warring 
alliance partners comprise the treatment 
columns. 
This is a simple idea: being exposed to a 
treatment will, using Alcock's (1972) 
phrase, increase the chances of "catching 
the war disease." We ask what the world 
should "look like" if a state has a border- 
ing state at war or an alliance -partner at 
war. Our expectation is that a WBN or 
WAP should substantially increase the 
probability of that state's joining the 
ongoing war of its WBN or WAR A fur- 
ther expectation is that this probability 
should increase with the combination of 
border and alliance treatments. Thus, we 
have taken one of several possible ap- 
proaches to diffusion-the growth of on- 
going wars. We have identified two possi- 
ble ("loosely necessary") agents by which 
those wars would grow. We have then 
posited a simple expectation of behavior 
given 'treatments' by those agents. The 
following section presents data that sim- 
ply but directly test these expectations. 
Findings 
Initially, it may be noted that the over- 
all rate of war diffusion is rather small. In 
the 3,746 nation-years in our data set 
there were only 94 cases of war diffusion. 
The overall rate of diffusion is thus 
2.51%. War diffusion is, to be sure, a 
relatively rare event, but rare does not 
mean "unimportant." Many statistically 
rare events are of considerable interest to 
scientists, particularly when their conse- 
quences are either highly lethal or very 
costly. For example, both lung cancer and 
earthquakes are both relatively rare, but 
are nonetheless the objects of attention for 
very large, nationally organized research 
efforts. War diffusion is both lethal and 
costly. Of the 240 cases of international 
war involvement in the Singer and Small 
data set, the 94 cases we studied represent 
39% of the total. Additionally, a great 
deal of the severity of war (i.e., how 
many die) may be explained in terms of 
the expansion or growth of war. In fact, 
from the data in Small and Singer's (1982) 
consideration of lethality in warfare, it is 
clear that most of the war-related deaths 
take place because of war expansion. 
Because war diffusion is a relatively 
rare event, it may be seen that under 
"loose necessity" a large number of treat- 
ments result in a much smaller number of 
cases of war diffusion. In this respect 
several points should be noted. First, we 
investigate here only one form of diffu- 
sion-infection, or the growth of an on- 
going war. We do not deal with demon- 
stration effects. Also if only the opportu- 
nity for interaction was of concern, we 
might expect ongoing wars to grow to in- 
clude all those nations with opportunity. 
However, willingness is important in such 
decisions. Put differently, decision 
makers choose behavior within the con- 
straints posed by the range of incentive 
structures within which they are imbed- 
ded. The effects of WBNs and WAPs are 
just one aspect of that structure. While 
other aspects of the structure may lead to 
the willingness to choose other foreign 
policy behaviors, it is impressive that the 
opportunity and willingness model of in- 
teraction opportunity is able to identify 
WBNs and WAPs as factors having a sig- 
nificant impact on war-joining behavior. 
The data analysis will take place in two 
stages. First, we will explore the extent to 
which the variables measuring opportu- 
nity and willingness have anything to do 
with war expansion. Put differently, we 
will show that there is a significant rela- 
tionship between the various measures of 
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Table 2. No Treatment, Treatments, and War Involvement, 1816-1965 
Warring Border or 
Border or Alliance Warring Alliance Partner 
War (No Treatment) (Treatment) 
Involvement No Yes Total No Yes Total 
No 14 3,641 3,655 2,320 1,335 3,655 
Yes 1 93 94 8 86 94 
opportunity and willingness and prodiv- 
ities to join a war. That done, the second 
part of our data analysis will be to exam- 
ine how various individual and combined 
treatments affect war-joining behavior. 
Do Opportunity and Willingness 
Influence War Diffusion? 
From the previous discussion of op- 
portunity and willingness it is obvious 
that we expect nations that have been 
exposed to either WBNs or WAPs will 
have a higher propensity to join a war 
than those that have not. We begin our 
analysis by examining the extent to which 
this expectation is borne out. Table 2 
reports two initial parts of this analysis. 
The left half presents the cross tabulation 
of a nation's having any border or any 
alliance and being a war joiner. Except for 
the 15 cases in the first column, this base- 
line is the same as the overall baseline. It 
is readily apparent that the table contains 
no relationship-"' Moving to the right 
half, it may be seen that when a nation is 
exposed to any of the treatments, the pro- 
pensity to join a war increases substan- 
tially. Put simply, in the baseline case 
2.4% of the nations participate, but under 
the treatments 6.1% join. 
While the left half of the table demon- 
strates that exposure to any treatment in- 
creases the likelihood of joining a war, we 
need to examine the effect of increasing 
numbers of treatments. Nations may at 
the same time have various types of war- 
ring borders, may be the members of 
several alliances of different types having 
members in the war or, more likely, have 
some combination of warring borders and 
alliances. Table 3 displays the cross 
tabulation of war involvement against the 
number of treatments to which a nation 
was exposed. It is clear from the data that 
as the amount of exposure increases, the 
rate of participation increases as well. The 
overall relationship (see Table 4) as mea- 
sured by the correlation ratio (eta), de- 
rived from a one-way analysis of vari- 
ance, is .452. 
The analysis has not thus far clarified 
which of the variables makes the great- 
est difference. There are, unfortunately, 
some difficulties in making such an assess- 
ment. Our dependent variable, war in- 
Table 3. War Diffusion and Number of Treatments to Which a Nation Was Exposed 
War Number of Treatments 
involvement 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 > 6 
No 2,320 703 372 142 57 34 12 15 
Yes 8 9 17 12 10 16 7 15 
Percentage yes .3 1.2 4.3 7.8 14.9 32.0 36.8 50.0 
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Table 4. Analysis of Variance for Treatments in Table 3 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Squares 
Treatments 18.737 13a 1.441 
Error 72.906 3,735 .20 
Note: F - 73.839, p < .001, eta - .452. 
aThe degrees of freedom are from the uncollapsed table, 
volvement, is dichotomous, which means 
that the usual techniques of regression 
and correlation are not appropriate. Nor- 
mally, one could approach this type of a 
problem with log-linear analysis, but an 
analysis based upon dichotomies of the 
six possible independent variables and 
war involvement would produce a table 
of 128 cells. Given the large total number 
of observations we have, this would not 
ordinarily be a problem; but in this in- 
stance only 94 of the cases indicate war 
diffusion, and allocating these in a very 
large table would produce such a large 
number of empty cells that analysis would 
be questionable. 
Fortunately, it is possible to gain esti- 
mates of the effects of the various inde- 
Table 5. Probit Estimates of Treatment 
Variables on War Involvement, 
1816-1965 
Parameter Estimate t-Statistic 
Constant -2.62 -31.80 
Bi .54* 9.97* 
B2 .36** 3.47** 
B3 .21* 3.77* 
Al .51* 5.68* 
A2 . .18**** 1.36**** 
A3 .31*** 3.14*** 
Note: Bi = contiguous borders, B2 cross-water 
borders, B3 colonial borders, Al defense alli- 
ances, A2 neutrality agreements, and A3 
ententes. 
*p < .01. 
**p < .02. 
***p > .05. 
****p > .10. 
pendent variables on war diffusion 
through probit, which, although sensitive 
to the highly skewed distribution of the 
data will allow us to make a preliminary 
comparison of the relative effect of the 
variables on war diffusion. Table 5 
displays the results of the probit analysis 
when a nation's war involvement is ana- 
lyzed in relation to its number of (1) con- 
tiguous WBNs (Bi); (2) cross-water 
WBNs (B2); (3) colonial WBNs (B3); (4) 
defense WAPs (Al); (5) neutrality WAPs 
(A2); and (6) entente WAPs (A3). The 
estimates it gives for the independent vari- 
ables are generally equivalent to the esti- 
mates of beta reported in regressions. The 
results given in Table 5 are generally con- 
sistent with the ideas of opportunity and 
willingness; that is, for the border vari- 
ables Bi has greater weight in influencing 
war joining than B2, and B2 has more 
than B3. The alliance variables are slight- 
ly different. While Al counts the most 
among these variables, A3 influences war 
joining much more than A2; in fact, from 
this analysis A2 seems to have little or no 
effect on war joinings1 
How Much Do the Variables 
Contribute to War Diffusion? 
Thus far, our analysis has indicated 
that any exposure to the treatment vari- 
ables substantially increases the chances 
of a nation's joining a war (Table 2), that 
more exposure increases such chances 
(Table 3), and that the strength of the im- 
pact of the treatment variables is ordered 
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approximately as our rationale for oppor- 
tunity and willingness suggested (Table 
5). What the analysis has not revealed is 
the magnitude of the impact of the indi- 
vidual and combined indicators of oppor- 
tunity and willingness. 
Let us begin with a brief, but necessary, 
description of the relatively straightfor- 
ward analysis that follows. Recall from 
Table 2 that we compared the rate of war 
joining among all nations to only those 
nations that had been exposed to at least 
one treatment variable. We may now, in 
effect, take Table 1 apart, examine the im- 
pact of each of the variables individually 
on war diffusion, and then combine each 
of the border variables with each of the 
alliance variables to observe their com- 
bined impacts on war diffusion. 
The first 3 rows of Table 6 report the 
results, for all nations of the baseline, 
of being exposed to one of the three types 
of WBNs or WAPs and the percentage 
change associated with the treatment.13 
Beginning with borders, two things are 
apparent. First, the presence of a WBN 
has a significant impact on war diffusion. 
In each case the presence of the treatment 
produces a marked increase in the propen- 
sity for diffusion, ranging from a 262% 
increase for the contiguous borders to 
slightly over 100% for the colonial 
borders.14 Second, the strength of the 
results is ordered as the opportunity 
hypothesis predicts, with the closest 
borders producing the strongest result and 
the most distant borders producing the 
weakest result.15 
Turning to the alliance variables shown 
in Table 6, a similar pattern may be seen, 
but with considerably stronger results. 
Defense alliances produce tfie substantial 
increase of 439% over the baseline. While 
the results for neutrality agreements and 
ententes are weaker, 297% and 166%, 
respectively, they are still strong. Again, 
the strength of the relationships is ordered 
from the strongest to the weakest commit- 
ments. As agents of the opportunity for 
interaction, both borders and alliances 
meet the expectation of increasing the 
probability of states' joining ongoing 
wars. In addition to the increased ease of 
interaction that borders provide (oppor- 
tunity), borders and alliances both indi- 
vidually increase the salience of the WAPs 
and WBNs and thus also the willingness 
to become involved in their conflicts. 
How do the border and alliance vari- 
ables interact with each other? The three 
border and three alliance variables com- 
bine, of course, to produce nine possi- 
bilities. The first three columns of Table 
7, report the results of these combinations 
for all nations. (Because the tables report- 
ing the combination of the variables con- 
tain eight cells, the cell corresponding to d 
in Table 1 is h.) It may readily be seen that 
there is a considerable amount of interac- 
tion between the border and alliance vari- 
ables in influencing the diffusion of war. 
The most potent effect is with the combi- 
nation of the contiguous WBNs and 
defensive WAPs. This should not be sur- 
prising, given our previous results and 
our hierarchy of importance within op- 
portunity and willingness. The latter 
derives clearly from the international rela- 
tions literature. Most geopolitical studies 
focus on direct contiguous borders 
because of their immediate impact and 
because they provide the most important 
opportunity for interaction. In turn, the 
form of alliance that, scholars theorize, 
creates the strongest bond between states 
is the defensive pact. Defense pacts pro- 
vide the most important indicator of sali- 
ence, commitment, and shared policy 
preference. The magnitude of the joint ef- 
fect is, to say the least, considerable, with 
the combination of these two variables 
producing an increase of 719% over the 
baseline cases in producing war diffusion. 
While that result is the strongest, the 
other results on the several combined 
variables also generally reveal a consider- 
able amount of interaction. Indeed, all 
contiguous border (Bi) and all noncolony 
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cross-water (B2) effects are improved 
when combined with alliance variables; 
and all defense and neutrality pact (Al 
and A2) effects are improved when com- 
bined with B1 and B2. Cross-water WBNs 
and defense WAPs, for example, combine 
to produce an increase of 602% over the 
baseline cases, while cross-water WBNs 
and neutrality WAPs combine to increase 
war diffusion 566% over the baseline 
cases. Even colonial borders (B3) and 
ententes (A3), the weakest of the individ- 
ual effects, produce significant increases 
on war joining when combined with the 
other variables-indeed, even when com- 
bined with each other (178%). 
Given the various combinations of our 
variables it is, of course, difficult to pro- 
duce an ordered prediction of their 
strength, as we did with the single vari- 
ables. However, it is worth noting that 
when the class of the WBN is held con- 
stant and the WAP class varies, with one 
exception the magnitudes of the impact 
are ordered within the groups. The sole 
exception is that the combination of con- 
tiguous WBNs is stronger with entente 
WAPs (413%) than it is with neutrality 
WAPs (404%). 
Thus far, our consideration of the prob- 
lem of war diffusion has treated all na- 
tions as if they were the same except for 
their exposure to the various treatments. 
Much of international relations theory, 
however, relies on the knowledge that all 
nations are not the same. A distinction 
among nations that traditionally has been 
central to an overwhelming part of the 
field of international relations is that be- 
tween major and minor powers. For our 
purposes, too, this is an important dis- 
tinction, since there is ample reason to 
believe that major and minor powers will 
differ in their behavior with respect to op- 
portunity and willingness in joining wars. 
Specifically, we should expect the major 
powers to respond to opportunities that 
are cross-water or colonial because, in the 
first instance, they have the greater 
capabilities necessary to become involved 
and, in the second instance, they not only 
have the capabilities but are much more 
likely to have colonial borders. More- 
over, while minor powers certainly had 
many alliances, major powers are over- 
represented among the nations with alli- 
ances, particularly defense agreements. 
The neatness of the analysis begins to 
break down when we analyze the data 
separately for the major and minor 
powers in the international system. We 
begin with the major powers. The effects 
of the individual border and alliance 
conditions for the major powers are given 
in the middle three columns of Table 6. 
Here it is evident that while each of the 
variables had a discernable effect on war 
diffusion, the results depart from the 
magnitudes and orderings given in the 
first three columns of the same table. 
Cross-water WBNs are the strongest 
border effect for the major powers as are 
neutrality WAPs. As we expect from our 
ideas about the strength of various forms 
of opportunity, colonial WBNs have only 
a weak effect. 
Note, however, that alliances are gener- 
ally of more importance for major powers 
than are borders and that this relationship 
is stronger for major powers than for all 
states combined. By definition, major 
powers are the actors with global (or at 
least multiregional) interests and capabil- 
ities. They would be more likely to be 
able to dominate smaller neighbors. As 
such, the greater impact of alliances is not 
surprising. 
The middle three columns of Table 7 
present the combinations of variables for 
the major powers. Again, there is clear in- 
teraction involved in these combinations, 
some of them astonishingly large. Indeed, 
every individual condition improves with 
the combined effects of borders and alli- 
ances. The combination of colonial WBNs 
and neutrality WAPs, for example, pro- 
duces an increase over the baseline of 
813%. As might be suspected in the case 
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of such a sharp increase, the number of 
cases is small (N = 3). Similarly, the 
cross-water WBNs and neutrality WAPs 
produce a gain of 1,019% for four cases. 
More surprising, perhaps, than the size 
of some of the gains observed is the fact 
that the combination that previously 
demonstrated the largest gain, the com- 
bination of contiguous WBN and defense 
WAP, for the major powers, shows only a 
modest increase. Here the gain is only 
302%; and while such an increase is not to 
be ignored, its modest size relative to 
some of the other combinations of vari- 
ables is not in accord with what we would 
expect from our interpretation of oppor- 
tunity and willingness or the findings pre- 
sented above. The significant increase 
found in the effects of B3 (colonial 
borders) in combination with all alliance 
types may be related to Most and Starr's 
(1980) findings on colonial borders above. 
While the numbers of cases are rather 
small, it is clear that the combined effects 
of colonial borders and alliances-(far- 
flung) opportunity and willingness-now 
match the earlier findings and arguments 
about the interests and capabilities of ma- 
jor powers. These findings give us some 
anticipation of what will be found with 
the minor powers, to which we now turn. 
The last three columns of Table 6 report 
the individual effects of WBNs and WAPs 
for the minor powers. First, it may be 
noted that with two glaring exceptions 
(B2 and B3, where the increases are very 
low) the treatment variables had clear ef- 
fects. The strongest of these was the 
presence of defense WAPs, where the in- 
crease was 451%. In addition, the results 
are ordered as our discussion of the 
strength of the various indicators sug- 
gests. Comparing the results for major 
powers (the middle three columns) and 
minor powers, the latter are more strong- 
ly affected both by contiguous borders 
(M1) and defense pacts (Al). The first 
finding is expected. Minor powers, vir- 
tually by definition, are those with local 
or regional concerns. Given the limited 
ability of minor powers to project power 
and thus their greater concern with via- 
bility in terms of immediate neighbors, 
direct borders should be of greatest 
importance. 
The Al results, however, are more in- 
triguing. Previous work by Siverson and 
King (1979) has demonstrated that alli- 
ances are likely "agents" of diffusion. 
Such research results directly address the 
war-alliance relationship that is of con- 
cern to many scholars and the related 
assertion that alliances act as conduits for 
the spread of international conflict (e.g., 
see Starr 1978b). Alliances might bring 
great power conflict into the regional sub- 
systems of small allies. Conversely, alli- 
ances might drag major, power allies into 
the local conflicts of their smaller alliance 
partners. Since the bulk of minor power 
defensive alliances are with major 
powers, the Al results appear to indicate 
in which direction the alliance conflict 
conduit has tended to work-minor 
powers being pulled into the ongoing 
wars of their major power allies. 
The last three columns of Table 7 report 
the results of the nine combinations of 
variables for the minor powers. Again, 
some of the increases are, to say the least, 
sharp. The situation where we expect the 
largest increase, contiguous WBNs and 
defense WAPs, does indeed show the 
strongest increase, with a magnitude of 
over 1,000%. Moreover, this time, the 
number of cases is not small. The first 
four variable combinations all show 
marked increases, then something inter- 
esting takes place. 
Once the more distant forms of oppor- 
tunity and willingness are encountered, 
the results drop substantially. In fact, for 
the last six combinations in the table the 
results are either meager or nonexistent. 
For all of these cases, the combined treat- 
ment results are less than the effects of the 
individual treatments; that is, the com- 
bined conditions make war diffusion less 
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likely. For the first time the results show 
negative interaction. One may initially 
suspect that this result is nothing more 
than the artifact of variable combinations 
producing numbers of cases so small that 
they disappear. But, as shown in the last 
three columns of Table 7, this is not the 
case. While the number of cases does go 
down because of the combination, they 
are certainly too big simply to attribute 
the absence of an effect to that artifact. 
The more likely explanation is to be 
found in the fact that these combinations 
do indeed represent the more distant 
forms of opportunity and lesser types of 
willingness and that minor powers, 
because of their lesser capabilities, are 
either reluctant or unable to enter con- 
flict. Wars, after all, do impose costs on 
participants; and minor powers may not 
occupy positions where the costs are 
tolerable. 
A Problem? 
Before drawing the results together 
there is a problem, or puzzle, that must be 
addressed. Throughout the data analysis 
it may be seen that there is a consistent 
pattern wherein the number of nations ex- 
posed to the various treatments is very 
large relative to the number of nations 
who actually join the war. Consider, for 
example, the data in the right half of 
Table 2, which offer the clearest display 
of this pattern. The data in that table 
show 1,421 cases of nations exposed to 
any of the treatments; but only 86 in- 
stances of the exposure result in the na- 
tions joining a war. To be sure, the pro- 
portion of those joining under the treat- 
ment is considerably larger than under the 
baseline, but it is nonetheless perplexing 
that only 6.44% of the cases exposed to 
any form of the treatment joined a war. 
There are a number of possible ap- 
proaches to evaluating the impact of these 
"error" cases to the validity of our find- 
ings. First, recall that we explicitly stated 
that we are working within a framework 
of 'loose necessity." Under this circum- 
stance we expect that there will be many 
"error" cases but that such error is more 
apparent than real. The requirements of 
opportunity and willingness do not pre- 
dict that a nation exposed to these condi- 
tions will join a war but only that its 
probability of joining will be substantially 
higher than where those conditions are 
not present. This situation is quite similar 
to that encountered by Bueno de Mes- 
quita (1981) in his consideration of the in- 
itiation of war. In his analysis it may be 
seen that nations have positive expected 
utility for war far more than they actually 
go to war, while in this research there are 
far more WBN-WAP interaction opportu- 
nities than there are instances of diffusion. 
In this research the importance of the 
idea of necessity may be seen in Table 1. 
The concern with overprediction is 
reflected in the number of cases in cell b. 
However, for necessary relationships the 
number of cases in b is irrelevant. The 
relevant cell to compare to cell d is c, 
which should be empty. Given our 'loose 
necessity" formulation, we should expect 
only a few cases in c, especially as a 
percentage of the total number of cases in 
the no-treatment column (i.e., the a + c 
column). Returning to the right half of 
Table 2, it is clear that although there are 
a very large number of cases in the no- 
treatment column (2,320), there are only 
eight in cell c. Similar relationships occur 
in the matrices that provide most of our 
results. (In the example given in n. 13 
reporting the results of contiguous WBNs 
there are only 27 cases in c out of a possi- 
ble 2,977 cases.) 
There is a second way to investigate the 
"error" cases. It is instructive to examine 
once again the data in the right half of 
Table 2. There it may be seen that most of 
the "error" is to be found in the cases in 
which a nation was exposed to only one 
of the treatments. The 703 "error" cases 
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Table 8. Occurrence of Single Border 
and Alliance Treatments, All Nations, 
1816-1965 
Number of Percentage 
Variable Single Treatments of Total 
131 328 46 
B2 75 10.5 
B3 259 36.4 
Al 10 1.4 
A2 6 .8 
A3 34 4.8 
Note: 131 contiguous borders, B2 cross-water 
borders, B3 colonial borders, Al = defense alli- 
ances, A2 neutrality agreements, and A3 
ententes. 
under that condition represent 52.7% of 
the total "error.' As exposure goes up, the 
rate of war joining goes up quite sharply. 
The question now is whether or not the 
712 cases (i.e., the 703 cases of "error" 
and the 9 cases of war joining) that re- 
ceived only single treatments are distrib- 
uted evenly across the opportunity and 
willingness variables. Table 8 summarizes 
this distribution. Clearly, exposure to a 
single B1 or B3 happened fairly frequently 
but did not have much of an effect. 
There is at least one interesting implica- 
tion that may be drawn from the above 
observations: decisions to join an ongoing 
war face considerable "friction." A single 
opportunity is rarely associated with war 
joining. It is only when the opportunities 
begin to accumulate, or, more important- 
ly, are attached to the political affinity in- 
dicated by an alliance that the chances of 
joining an ongoing war begin to build sig- 
nificantly. The fact that wars are, in a 
sense, undersubscribed is not surprising. 
Theories of collective goods tell us that it 
is not rational for a nation to undertake a 
costly course of action if someone else will 
do it for them (Olson and Zeckhauser 
1966) and wars can be among the most 
costly of all the courses of action a nation 
may choose. 
Conclusion 
This study began with the aim of inves- 
tigating the diffusion of war-in terms of 
the expansion of ongoing conflict-be- 
tween 1816 and 1965. This was done in 
the context of opportunity and willing- 
ness, as indicated by WBNs and WAPs. 
We have proposed a relatively simple ex- 
pectation derived from the opportunity, 
willingness, and interaction opportunity 
concepts and investigated it through a set 
of comparisons between treatment and 
no-treatment groups of data. The data 
presented in the tables support the conten- 
tion that war does expand among nations 
along the indicators that operationalize 
opportunity and willingness and that the 
strength of the relationship is ordered by 
the type of border or alliance, as hypoth- 
esized. 
We have added to the understanding of 
war diffusion in several ways. While one 
body of previous research has indicated 
an important geographic basis for diffu- 
sion and other research has indicated that 
alliances are important in spreading con- 
flict, the present work has the virtue of 
combining geographic and political vari- 
ables so that the strong interaction of 
these two elements may be observed. 
The scope of the present analysis is also 
more extensive than previous studies of 
war diffusion. The data used are global 
(not limited to any single geographic 
region) and cover all international wars 
from 1816 to 1965.16 We provide separate 
analyses of major and minor powers, 
revealing different patterns of diffusion 
and indicating how major and minor 
powers differentially relate to the ele- 
ments of opportunity and willingness. 
Perhaps most useful to the theoretical 
development of the study of war diffu- 
sion, we have presented more evidence as 
to the applicability of research based on 
opportunity, willingness, and their inter- 
action. We have shown here that this 
theoretical approach is applicable to 
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large-scale war as delineated by the Cor- 
relates of War Project's data set. The 
previous applications of this approach by 
Most and Starr focused violent conflict on 
a smaller scale, whether internal or exter- 
nal. 
We also have more confidence in the 
theoretical scope of this approach, since 
we now find that it can help explain two 
different conceptualizations of diffusion: 
(1) the linkage-penetration view taken in 
earlier esearch by Most and Starr (among 
others), where events elsewhere change a 
state's disposition to behave similarly; 
and (2) the infection-contagion approach 
taken here, where diffusion is conceived 
as the growth of ongoing wars. 
The refinement of such analytic tools is 
vital in the design of future research. With 
multiple sources of evidence indicating 
that diffusion processes of various kinds 
do exist in international relations, we now 
require further work in the specification 
of the processes at work in various kinds 
of diffusion, including the conditions 
under which the diffusion of violent con- 
flict takes place. The further specification 
of these processes might also help us 
understand the interaction between op- 
portunity and willingness and various 
theories as to why wars are likely to be 
larger at particular times than at others. 
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1. While diffusion has been given several mean- 
ings, and has a number of dimensions, we will be us- 
ing it essentially to mean the growth of an ongoing 
conflict, the process by which states join an ongoing 
war and the scope of the conflict becomes enlarged. 
The concept of diffusion and its theoretical relevance 
to the study of international conflict is reviewed ex- 
tensively in Most, Starr, and Siverson 1989. For other 
reviews of the diffusion concept, see Most and Starr 
1981, O'Loughlin 1984 and Welsh 1984. For an over- 
view of the renewed interest in geopolitical ap- 
proaches (including diffusion) to war, see Diehl 
1988. For a classic statement on the contagion of 
political conflict, see Schattschneider 1960. 
2. We use the term treatment to emphasize the 
epidemiological nature of our research, not to sug- 
gest that we are performing an experiment in which 
we have the ability to randomize and control ex- 
posure. However, what we report is in many 
respects a historical experiment, similar in method to 
the procedures described by Singer (1974) and Holsti 
and North (1965). 
3. Although research on this point is not clear 
(Garnhanm 1988), it is reasonable to suspect that 
under some circumstances geographical proximity 
to, or shared borders with, some other nation will in 
themselves influence a nation's willingness to 
become involved in conflict. If so, opportunity and 
willingness are not independent, as we noted. In- 
deed, borders themselves can be seen in terms of en- 
vironmental possibilism by providing possibilities 
for interaction. The warring border nation model, 
however, can be seen in terms of cognitive behavior- 
ism or willingness, as activities on a state's borders 
effect the perceptions of threat, uncertainty, and op- 
portunity held by that state's decision makers. 
Clearly, most nations are likely to be sensitive to the 
security concerns of neighboring nations or, when 
the capabilities are present, are likely to see their 
neighbors as the greatest potential threats to their 
own security. 
4. Of course, states may attempt to manipulate 
their immediate political geography by creating 
neighbors (e.g., Belgium in 1830) or eliminating 
them (e.g., Poland in 1939), but the costs of these ac- 
tivities are likely to be quite high. 
5. Alliances, of course, are not a perfect indicator 
of willingness. For example, while there is general 
tendency for alliances to be reliable, it is clear that 
reliability is less than complete (Sabrosky 1980). In 
addition, some alliances are specific to certain issues 
or geographic areas (e.g., NATO), and their exis- 
tence does not mean that one ally will join another 
no matter where the conflict. Also, alliances signed 
at one time may deteriorate while continuing to exist 
formally. In short, we do not construe alliances as 
indicating a general willingness to fight. However, 
alliances have long been recognized as the key means 
that nations have chosen to indicate their political 
position in the international system. Formal alli- 
ances are matters of serious concern to decision 
makers and in addition to their presumed rewards of 
enhanced security, they impose costs and risks both 
domestically and internationally (Sullivan 1974). 
6. In fact, Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) 
successfully apply expected utility theory to the 
problem of explaining which side nations will join in 
a war. While this is a problem similar to the one pur- 
sued here, it does not directly address the question of 
diffusion. For some other differences, see n. 16. 
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7. Following Small and Singer (1982), the major 
powers and the years of their inclusion in that group 
are Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), Italy (1861- 
1943), the United Kingdom (1816-1965), Russia- 
USSR (1816-1965), Japan (1895-1945), Prussia- 
Germany (1816-1945), the United States (1989- 
1965), France (1816-1940, 1945-65) and China 
(1949-65). 
8. This third category of data was the most diffi- 
cult to obtain because of the number and almost un- 
believable obscurity of some colonies. We were 
aided very considerably by Henige's (1970) compre- 
hensive list of colonial governors. This list, which 
begins with the fifteenth century, identifies all politi- 
cal units that were the colonial possession of some 
other nation. Finding them in this list then permitted 
relatively easy location in one of the historical 
atlases. 
9. Copies of the coding scheme employed in this 
study are available from Siverson. It should be 
noted that in general we followed the data given by 
Small and Singer (1982) with respect to war expan- 
sion. We did, however, depart from their delinea- 
tion of what constituted war joining in a few cases. 
For example, they show Japan as joining World War 
II on 7 December 1941. While it is true that Japan 
began fighting the United States on that day, it is 
also true that the Japanese decision had relatively 
less to do with the European war that had been in 
progress since 1939 than it did Japan's war with 
China that had been ongoing since 1937. Hence, we 
do not treat Japan as joining the war. Also, we do 
not treat as war joiners the nations that left World 
War II (albeit briefly) and then changed sides (i.e., 
Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria) to reenter it. It makes 
sense to count the initial participation only. It 
should be noted that including these cases would 
have favored the opportunity and willingness 
hypotheses. 
10. Recall that Most and Starr (1980) distin- 
guished between reinforcement, or addiction (where 
a state's war behavior affects the probability of its 
own subsequent behavior) and diffusion (where a 
state's war behavior affects the probability of the 
subsequent war behavior of other states). They also 
recognized that either could have positive or nega- 
tive effects (either increasing or decreasing the prob- 
ability of war behavior). The reader must be alerted 
that the matrix employed in the present analyses 
follows that utilized in Most et al. 1987 and is not the 
same as the matrix used in Most and Starr 1981 or 
Starr and Most 1983, 110-11. 
11. The single case of war involvement by a na- 
tion with no bordering nations of any kind and no 
alliance involvement is New Zealand's entry into 
World War II in 1939. 
12. The weak results from A2 may be partly due 
to the fact that there were far fewer of this type of 
alliance in the data set than either of the other two 
types. When they are analyzed together, the more 
numerous alliances may overwhelm A2. In the 
analysis that follows it may be seen that A2 does not 
apply to a large number of cases but that when it 
does, a clear effect is evident. 
13. Recall the treatment matrix from Table 1. In 
the single treatment tables that follow, the numbers 
being reported are those from cell d of that figure. 
Reporting all the tables would be cumbersome, so 
only the effects of the treatments are given. As an ex- 
ample of what a table looks like, we offer a full table 
for the treatment involving B1. Note that the 
numbers of cases reported in the tables refer to the 
total of the b-d column and that the percentages 
reported are for d of that total. 
Contiguous Warring 
Bordering Nation 
War Participation Absent Present 
Absent 2,950 705 
Present 27 67 
Total 2,977 772 
14. What we mean by percentage increase is the 
magnitude by which involvement in a treatment 
situation is larger than the base. Thus, the first three 
columns of Table 6, while the B1 treatment percent- 
age of 8.7 is more than three times the size of the 
baseline percentage of 2.4, the relevant measurement 
is the amount of increase from 2.4 to 8.7. Thus, the 
appropriate calculation is the treatment percentage 
minus the base percentage with the remainder di- 
vided by the base percentage. 
15. The tests of significance used in Tables 6 and 7 
require a brief comment. Because the percentage 
changes between the no-treatment and treatment 
columns are often based on relatively small numbers 
of cases, the skeptical reader may be curious as to (1) 
whether the observed changes are statistically sig- 
nificant and (2) whether there is any way that the 
method could fail to produce a change, i.e., whether 
the results are predetermined. With respect to the 
first question, we have tested the differences for 
statistical significance in two ways. First, when the 
number of cases in the treatment column is greater 
than 20, the p-value is derived from the Z-score in a 
test of a difference of proportions. When the number 
of cases is less than 20, we have determined the 
p-value from Fisher's exact test. (Recall that the cases 
in the treatment column are also present in the base- 
line no-treatment column. Because the two results 
are therefore not independent, before we could test 
for statistical significance between the no-treatment 
baseline and the treatment, it was necessary to 
remove the treatment cases from their respective 
baseline. A full set of the resulting tables is available 
from Siverson.) More important than each test of 
significance is the correspondence between our 
theoretical structure and the overall pattern of the 
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data. With respect to the second question (whether 
the results are predetermined), if one suspects that 
the method will always produce an increase in the 
observed cases of war diffusion under the treatment 
condition, see the last three columns of Table 7, 
where failure does occur. 
16. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) are in- 
terested only in those cases of war expansion that 
took place within the first two months of a war. 
Hence, their main data set contains only 40 cases of 
war joining. In addition, they exclude from their 
data set the participation of the four Commonwealth 
nations (i.e., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa) that joined World War II in 1939, on 
the grounds of missing data (that is, they had no alli- 
ance memberships). Those cases are included here. 
We also include the cases from the Korean War, 
which were totally excluded by Altfeld and Bueno de 
Mesquita (p. 94, n. 7). 
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